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JURISDICTION
PersonalJurisdiction Over Nonresident Debtors:
When May Creditors Sue at Home?








A corporate creditor may wish to centralize a lawsuit
it starts in the courts of its home state, even though facts
leading to) the controversy arose far from home. Would
a nonresident forced to defend tin(ler such circum-
stances be deprived of constitutional due process? This
is the question posed in Biurger King Cotporation i,.
Rudzewicz.
ISSUE
In Binger King, the Supreme Court will consider
whether the parties and the controversy have a suffi-
cient relationship to a Florida federal court to support
imposing personal jurisdiction there over a Michigan
def'endant. This will require that the jurisdictional facts
of the case I)e examined to determine whether the dce-
fendant can be forced to dlefend in Florida without
violating his right to fmdamental lhirness guaranteed
under the Dtue Process Clause of the United States
(ollstitlition.
FACTS
john Rudzewicz contracted with Burger King, a
Florida corporation, to purchase a Burger King firan-
chise in Michigan. When Burger King never received
payments called for under the contract, it brought suit
against Rudzewicz and another in the United States
Court for the Southern )istrict of" Florida, alleging
breach of' contract and tradema'rk infringement. The
court denied Rudzewicz's motion to dismiss Ir lack of'
persomal jurisdiction. After trial and judgment against
him for approximately a quarter of a million dollars,
RudIewicz appealed. I'he United States Court of' Ap-
peals for tile Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that his
challenge to the court's i)ersonal jurisdictioi was proper
and should have been u)held (72'1 F.2d 1505 (Il98.1)).
Gene R. Shreve i% a Profissor of Law at New orh Law School,
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'The two-judge majority noted that Rudzewicz had
no office in Florida, nor did it appear that he had ever
been there. Contract negotiatioms were conducted lbe-
tween Rudzewicz and Burger King's district representa-
tive entirely in Michigan. Anticipated j)rolits from tile
franchise would derive exclusively from Michigan food
sales. h'lherefore, concluded the mijority: "Rudzewicz
lacked Pair notice that the distant corporate headquar-
ters which insulated itself' from direct dealings with him
would later seek to assert jurisdiction over him in the
courts of its owl holme state."
A Florida statute provides that state may exercise
jurisdiction over anyone who breaches a contract by
"Failing to perf'orin acts required by the contract to Ibe
performed" in Florida. While the language of' this -long
arm" statute had been met, the majority held that the
lack of fair notice to Rudzewicz ofd the possibility of' suit
in Florida deprived the proceeding of f'undamental
fairness required by the Due Process Clause of the Con-
stitution. 'o force Rudzewicz to defend so Pt' 'rom
home, observed the majority, would both increase the
cost of defense and impair his ability to call Michigan
witnesses. Acknowledging that Rudzewicz appeared to
be a person of considerable financial resources and coitl-
mercial sophistication, the majority nonetheless read the
Facts to reveal a disparity of' bargaining power between
him and Burger King which would make Florida juris-
diction particularly unfair. Ill addition, the majority
expressed concern that "elements of surprise .... if' s;ac-
tioned, could ultimately sow the seeds of' defaultjudg-
ments against franchisees owing smaller debts."
One judge dissented. He argued that, because both
the franchise agreement and lease signed hy appellee
contained clauses requiring all questions of' inter)reta-
tion to be governed by Florida law, Rudzewicz had so
availed himself of' Florida law as to make it fair to assert
Florida jurisdiction over him. Also, the dissent was nit-
convinced that a Florida suit would Ibe fatr less conven-
ient to Rudzewicz or that tile facts of' the case rellected a
disparity of' bargaining power between lie piarties.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
In addressinig the question of whether personal juris-
diction over Rudzewicz would violate the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution, the Court has to look at the
cause and effectl of' a long line of' precedents. Impor-
tantly, in International Shoe Co. v. State !f li'ashinglon (326
U.S. 310 (19,15)), the Court held that the Due Process
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Clause permitted jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants who could nt I)e found and served in the
fortlll state-as long as doing so was fair under the
circumstances ofW the case. The Supreme Court has
struggled since to make this somewhat inchoate stan-
dard intelligible.
With a single exception, the Supreme Court failed to
strike down an assertion of judicial jurisdiction in the
thirty years Following International Shoe. )uring this pe-
riod, some state and lower federal courts applied tile
)ue Process Clause to restrain themselves. Others did
not. Then, in a series oflcases (Sh//er V. Hedter (-t33 U.S.
186 (1977)), Kulko to. Superior Gourt of'Califin uia (4361 U.S.
8.1 (19781), World-11ide IVolkiiiage, Corp. to. Wood.son (444t'
U.S. 286 (1980)) and R.ho v. Savchuck (.4I, U.S. 320
(1980)), the Supreme Court increased due process pro-
tections availalle to nonresident defendants.
The Court tilla now be in the process of striking a
balance in regulating personaljurisdiction between the
l(is sez-faire allroach of the post-litternational Shoe period
and the constraints of its ShaJ/'r line of decisions. The
Court decided three l personal jurisdiction cases last
term: Keelon V. Hustlr Magazine, In'.(10, S. Ct. 1-173
(1981), Previe, . 1983-8-1 term, pp. 57-60); Calder v.]one.
(104 S. Ct. 1.182 (1981), Preview, 1983-84 term, pp. 111-
13); and thelicopteo Nalionaah.% de Columbia v. Hall (1041 S.
Ct. 1868 (198,t), Preview 1983-8-1 tern, pp. 57-60). In
addition to Binger King, the Supreme Colti has agreed
to review a further personal jurisdiction case: Phlilip
Petroleum Co. To. Shuit. (Docket No. 8-1-233)-to he ar-
gued on Febrtlary 25, 1985.
In Burger King, tile Court may flind occasion to re-
turn to tile Forseeahilitv test discussed but not clarified in
WorldI-Wide Volkswvagen. For a iorum to have personal
jurisdiction, how reasonably predictable must it be to the
nonresident defendant that his or her acts could lead to
suit there? In addition, the Court may return to tile
split-cotmacts issue raised ill Keelon. Even if' some of'
Rudzewicz's acts related to the controversy (the Iromise
to mail payments to Florida, contractual choice of' Flor-
ida law) can be centered in the l'irum state, iany of' his
acts clearly occurred in Michigan. W\ill the Court Follow
its approach in Keelon and attach decisive importance to
related contacts with the Firtum although most contacts
related to the controversy were centered elsewhere?
Finally, what aid, if' any, will Burger King's case for
personal jurisdiction receive frin the fact that it is a
Florida corporation, or that the agreements Rudzewicz
signed contained provisions sul)jecting them to Florida
law? Burger King may provide the Court an olortunity
to demonstrate how flar it is willing to take the idea
expressed in Calder that Forunm citizenship is capable of'
adding strength to a plaintiff's case for personaljurisdic-
tion. It may also create an oppotrtunity to express what
the Court regards to Ibe the proper relationship between
personal jurisdiction and the choice of'law process.
ARGUMENTS
For Burger King (Counsel of Record,joel S. Penein, 1201 City
National Bank Building, 25 IV. Flag/er Sliert, Miami, Fl.
33130; telephone (305) 358-2800)
1. Exercising jurisdiction in Florida did not of fend due
process because Rudzewicz purposefunilly availed him-
self of' the benefits and protection ol'that frum.
2. Burger King's cause of' action arose out of Rudze-
wicz's contacts with tile forum.
For Rudzewicz (Coupmel of Record, "'1homa. H. Oehmke, 639
Beauben, Detroit, Ml 48226; elephone (313) 963-3525)
!. The minimum contacts necessary to support personal
jurisdiction in Florida are lacking here.
2. It is f'undamentally unfiair for Burger King to concetl-
trate its franchise litigation in Florida.
3. Rudzewicz should only be required to (lefenid in Mi-
chigan, where he is domiciled, where the business was
transacted and where the f'ranchised restaurant is
located.
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